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Abstract. This paper presents a cloud modelling language for defining
essential cloud properties, enabling the modelling and reasoning about
security issues in cloud environments from a requirements engineering
perspective. The relationship between cloud computing and security as-
pects are described through a meta-model, aligning concepts from cloud
computing and security requirements engineering. The central concept
of the proposed approach is built around cloud services, where the prop-
agation of relationships from a social perspective, abstract software pro-
cesses and the foundational infrastructure layer are captured. The pro-
posed concepts are applied on a running example throughout the paper
to demonstrate how developers are able to capture and model cloud con-
cepts across multiple conceptual layers, facilitating the understanding of
cloud security requirements and the design of security-embedded cloud
systems to realise organisational needs.
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ments, Modelling Language, Security Requirements Engineering
1 Introduction
Cloud computing enables the provisioning of a wide range of cloud services, deliv-
ered on a self-servicing basis for cloud users based on the concept of abstracting
physical and virtual computing resources. This paradigm offers seemingly unlim-
ited scalability, availability and flexibility through a pay-per-use model, where
users are able to select and deploy cloud services that satisfy their requirements
without worrying about how the cloud service is implemented or delivered. How-
ever in order to take advantage of these benefits, the distributed nature of the
involved technologies implicitly requires the outsourcing of business processes
and data to off-premise, third party providers. Thus the users are required to
sacrifice a degree of access and control over their data, relying on third party
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providers to ensure that their data is kept secure and available. As the concept of
cloud computing evolves from utility services to the foundational focus of busi-
ness IT infrastructure, there is a clear need for ensuring the security of cloud
computing systems and maintaining service-provider transparency.
Cloud computing is an evolving term in which the core characteristics has
seen numerous reiterations, definitions and is over-saturated in terms of standard
definitions [8]. Producing a concrete meaning, reasoning or realisation of cloud
computing is hugely dependent on the sector and discipline; between industry,
academia, levels of abstraction and granularity, all parties attempts to provide
their own definitions [5]. Despite the perceived immaturity of the concept, specif-
ically concerning security, privacy and jurisdictional issues, organisations are still
integrating cloud computing as part of their business strategy [4, 3]. Some have
even acknowledged the numerous issues but have opted to use the technology
regardless, citing the need to keep up with competitors and stay relevant in
today’s industry [2, 6].
The primary challenge in cloud computing adoption is the lack of a sys-
tematic methodology to facilitate the understanding, reasoning and modelling
of non-functional aspects, specifically regarding security issues [18, 10]. Com-
bined with a deploy-first, fix-later approach, this creates scenarios resulting in
high losses when deploying business systems to the cloud in terms of financial
assets, man-hours and reputation [19]. For example moving from a traditional
IT environment towards a cloud environment without adequate planning and
understanding of the security issues creates systems that are insecure by de-
sign, that is the system will inherit both traditional security issues in addition
to cloud specific issues. The result is insecure operational systems riddled with
vulnerabilities which requires constant patching and even redesigns, where the
underlying cause is the lack of a methodological approach for understanding and
addressing security issues during the system life-cycle. Thus there is a lack of a
holistic modelling language that captures user security requirements and cloud
computing properties within a well-defined contextual environment, which sat-
isfies the demand for understanding and realising the requirements for secure
cloud-based systems [19, 4, 7].
In this paper we present a modelling language for defining cloud computing
properties, based on capturing and modelling the security requirements of or-
ganisational systems and providing case-by-case guidance towards deployment
properties in cloud environments. This work is part of an on-going research ef-
fort to create a framework for holistically modelling secure cloud computing
systems, grounded in security requirements engineering and cloud computing
security concepts. The framework consists of the modelling language, a pro-
cess to systematically apply the concepts to the system-under-design and a tool
to facilitate automated security requirement analysis. Our work benefits users
involved in the process of securing cloud computing systems, for example organi-
sational stakeholders that wish to migrate aspects of their business system to the
cloud, providing guidance for security engineers modelling cloud environments
or allowing cloud users to understand the security properties of cloud systems.
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Therefore in the running example we introduce the users of our work as organi-
sational stakeholders and cloud security engineers under their employment. Our
contributions in this paper are:
– Definition of a cloud service to provide abstract and fine-grained description
of cloud systems.
– Concepts required to holistically model a cloud computing environment
through a three layer approach which describes properties at the organi-
sation, application and infrastructure level.
– Holistic threat and vulnerability analysis through decomposition and prop-
agation of operationalised security constraints through separate or composi-
tions of conceptual cloud layers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A motivating scenario for migrating
hospital processes to the cloud is presented in section 2. The cloud modelling
language and cloud computing security concepts are defined in section 3. In
section 4 we discuss the respective related work. Finally we conclude the paper
in section 5, noting the on-going work and contributions.
2 Health-care Running Example
The health-care industry is one example where business and organisational goals
are enacted through a complex environment, involving multiple facets of tech-
nology and stakeholders such as the exchange of data through disparate systems,
collaboration between geographically dispersed medical personnel and a rapidly
growing repository of electronic records and medical images [21]. Thus there is
a need to ensure the availability of medical assets, interoperability between col-
laborating health-care partners and reducing IT upkeep costs. However, due to
the sensitive nature of health-care data, there are rigorous federal regulations
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) sur-
rounding security and privacy in data storage, processing and transit practises.
In traditional health-care systems the administrators, doctors and nurses are
responsible for ensuring strict HIPAA compliance. However, one of the primary
security concerns when moving health-care processes to the cloud is the dissem-
inated responsibility for compliance with key regulations such as HIPAA, due
to the unavoidable loss of control over valuable assets and the reliance on third-
parties to ensure secure practises are satisfied. Our running example shown in
Fig. 1 describes a scenario where one hospital wishes to partially oﬄoad their
patient records management system to the cloud, in order to improve the avail-
ability and interoperability of the records. This information is captured using
organisational goal models with existing security requirements engineering ap-
proaches, in this example Secure Tropos [14].
3 Cloud Modelling Language
In this section we discuss the cloud computing paradigm and how we capture
the essential characteristics from a security requirements engineering perspec-
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Fig. 1. Simple organisational goal model of hospital processes.
tive. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides the
following definition for cloud computing: “Cloud computing is a model for en-
abling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications,
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interaction.”, where the cloud model is composed
of “five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment mod-
els.” [1]. We are interested in modelling the service and deployment models, as
each service delivery model has a unique set of associated threats and vulner-
abilities at the cloud level, while also posing a threat to existing traditional
technologies in a cloud environment [11]. The cloud-specific security issues are
based on existing work, where our running example demonstrates several cloud
threats and vulnerabilities identified by Hashizume et al. [23]. We define our
modelling language through established concepts from software security, cloud
computing and requirements engineering, combining knowledge from these do-
mains to describe security properties of cloud computing software systems. We
follow the Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) approach from the
requirements engineering domain [22], where we argue that a cloud service em-
bodies the realisation of a goal.
The proposed cloud meta-model is shown in Fig. 2, illustrating the relation-
ships and attributes of concepts required to describe security in cloud comput-
ing through a semi-formal UML notation. The meta-model guides the process of
modelling cloud computing systems, through the semi-automated instantiation
of concepts and attributes with optional user input to broadly capture scenar-
ios with security in mind. The conceptual model is divided in three groups of
concepts. The first group (mainly located on the left side of the meta-model)
represents concepts relating to security requirements engineering. The second
group (central part of the meta-model) represents concepts for the requirements
engineering analysis whereas the third group (right part of the meta-model)
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represents the cloud computing concepts. In the following subsections all respec-
tive concepts are described based on the aforementioned three groups. For every
concept a reference to the running example is provided for better realising the
proposed model.
Fig. 2. The Cloud Meta-Model showing the relationships between concepts.
3.1 Security Requirements Engineering Concepts
The proposed concepts are grounded in principles from the requirements engi-
neering and security requirements engineering domain [12–14, 22], in order to
facilitate the construction of security-ensured software systems from abstract
operational needs. The security-oriented aspects of the modelling language are
defined below:
Actor: An actor represents an entity that has intentionality and strategic
goals within a software system or around the organisational environment. A1:
Patient, A5: CSP, A2: Hospital and A3: Pharmacy are examples of actors.
Malicious Actor: This subset of actor represents a stakeholder with mali-
cious intentions, realised through attacks on the system to exploit vulnerabilities
and compromise assets. An example of a malicious actor named A4: Malicious
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Actor is shown in the running example, where they pose the threat Customer-
data manipulation.
Goal: Goals represent a condition in the world that an actor or system
under consideration should achieve. The notion of a goal represents the strategic
interests of stakeholders. We convert the concept of goals from requirements
engineering to correspond to cloud services, where each goal in an organisational
model is mapped to a cloud service. We explain the mapping in detail further
on in the cloud computing concepts section below in 3.2.
Threat: A threat embodies the concept of causing harm to an entity, in soft-
ware security this typically indicates gaining access to, modifying or damaging
assets. In the cloud computing context, threats may impact multiple abstract
layers. Referring to the running example, the threat Customer-data manipula-
tion is posed by a malicious actor, where the threat impacts both cloud service 1:
Patient Details Service and cloud service 2: E-prescription Service. The threat is
also realised through the Cross-site scripting and SQL injection attacks. Threats
are unaddressed if at least one vulnerability associated to the threat is not pro-
tected by a security mechanism. This is graphically indicated by a exclamation
mark inside a red circle, while the satisfaction attribute is flagged false for the
instantiated instance of the threat.
Security Constraint: This is a restriction related to security issues, such
as the established principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA).
A security constraint is placed from an actor to another actor based around one
constrained entity, in this case a goal. This relationship represents the security
needs of actors when achieving their goals, which in a cloud computing context
indicates security needs that cloud services are required to satisfy. In our running
example we have both satisfied and unsatisfied security constraints, respectively
indicated visually by a green circle enclosing the letter “s” and a red circle
enclosing an exclamation mark. The security constraint Correct credentials is
satisfied because it is enforced through a security objective, Ensure only user
groups with correct credentials are given access.
Security Objective: The security objective describes the conditions, crite-
ria and approaches to satisfy security constraints. A high-level description of the
security properties provides flexibility when choosing security solutions, as mul-
tiple security mechanisms can be implemented to realise the security objective.
Security Mechanism: A security mechanism represents standard security
methods for satisfying security objectives, which is described as a high-level
solution. In our running example, the security mechanisms Identity and access
management and Dynamic credentials implements the security objective Ensure
only user groups with correct credentials are given access. It is the security ex-
perts responsibility for selecting and realising security mechanisms during the
implementation stage, where they decide the most suitable security mechanism
through our cloud models.
Vulnerability: This describes a weakness which allows an attacker to reduce
a system’s information assurance. An example of a vulnerability is Insecure in-
terface and APIs, which impacts both cloud service 1: Patient Details Service
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and cloud service 2: E-prescription Service. The vulnerability can be protected
by the security mechanism Web application scanners, as seen in the running ex-
ample where the protected vulnerability is visually indicated as satisfied by the
letter “s” inside a green circle.
Attack: An attack embodies a specific method of carrying out a threat in
order to exploit vulnerabilities in the system. Cross-site scripting and SQL injec-
tion are examples of attacks that exploit the vulnerability Insecure interface and
APIs, where they are both realised from the threat Customer-data manipulation.
3.2 Cloud Computing Concepts
In this section the concepts that are essential for capturing cloud computing
properties are presented, centred around the concept of cloud services which are
the basic type of resource in a cloud environment.
Cloud Service: A cloud service can be described as a set of six concepts:
capability, actor, resource, relationships, service model, deployment model. An
example of an instantiated cloud service is cloud service 1: Patient Details Ser-
vice, which has the cloud service description Patient Details Service, the end-user
dependency relationship from the actor A1: Patient, the service-provider depen-
dency relationship from the actor A2: Hospital, the managed relationship from
the actor A5: CSP, the requires relationship to virtual resource Patient Data,
the constraint relationship from the security constraints SC1: Keep information
CIA and SC2: Patient access not compromised, the SaaS service model and the
public deployment model.
Capability: A capability describes, at a high level, an atomic action that
is performed by a cloud service to produce a desired outcome. In our running
example we have not explicitly modelled capabilities, because the cloud services
cloud service 1: Patient Details Service and cloud service 2: E-prescription Ser-
vice both provide atomic capabilities. That is if a cloud service only provides
an atomic capability, the capability itself is the cloud service and is represented
as such. If a cloud service provides two or more capabilities, it is conceptually
a composite cloud service where each capability is explicitly represented as an
entity belonging to the specific cloud service.
Actor: A cloud service involves direct and indirect stakeholders, disparately
distributed throughout the cloud management levels. We define two specialised
roles of actors in the cloud, the cloud user and the cloud service provider.
Resource: Assets are represented through resources, which is essential for
understanding cloud computing systems and reasoning about security properties.
We define two subtypes of resources: Virtual Resource to represent information
and intangible data and Physical Infrastructure to represent tangible assets.
Physical Infrastructure is a conceptual container to hold Infrastructure Nodes,
which abstractly represents physical computing components such as processing
servers, data storage and networking connections.
Cloud Service Model: The cloud service provider provides a high-level
description of how a cloud service is delivered, which indicates the level of control
and the parties responsible for managing computing components. We include
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in the model the respective cloud service models; Software-as-a-Service(SaaS),
Platform-as-a-Service(PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service(IaaS) [1]. The cloud
service user has the highest level of control in the IaaS model, a lesser degree
of control for the PaaS model and little to no control for the SaaS model. For
example in the IaaS model the cloud provider is responsible for providing and
managing the low-level components such as networking, storage, servers and
configuring virtualisation to ensure that users of the service are able to manage
the high-level components such as the operating system, application and data.
Cloud Deployment Model: The type of deployment models are also nec-
essary for security reasoning. Thus we include the cloud deployment models as
public, private, community and hybrid [1]. The deployment model determines
the user group, level of access and accessibility of the cloud service. It also explic-
itly determines the physical location, ownership and management of computing
resources such as infrastructure and data.
Relationships: We propose five types of relationships that are required to
capture interactions with cloud services:
– Dependency: One actor is dependent on another actor to deliver a cloud
service. The depender actor is either a cloud user or an end-user. The de-
pendee actor is a cloud service provider, who themselves can also be a cloud
user. A cloud user is an actor that uses an cloud service but has dependents,
for example A2: Hospital is a cloud service provider and cloud user because
they provide the cloud service 1: Patient Details Service to the end-user A1:
Patient, but A2: Hospital uses the cloud service provider A5: CSP and is
dependent on them to provide components of the cloud service.
– Requires: One or more resources are required by a cloud service. For exam-
ple the cloud service Patient Details Service requires Virtual Resource: Pa-
tient Data, indicating that the cloud service requires digital patient records
to perform computing processes such as creating, editing and deleting data.
– Security Constraint: One or more security constraints are placed on a
cloud service. As explained in the security requirements concepts section
previously, this represents the security needs of stakeholders which has to be
satisfied by the cloud service.
– Manages: One or more actors are responsible for managing a cloud service.
We use the term manage to represent parties responsible for providing cloud
resources, configuring cloud components and ensuring security and jurisdic-
tional requirements are fulfilled. For example A5: CSP is responsible for
managing the IaaS, PaaS and SaaS layers of the cloud service Patient De-
tails Service, while A2: Hospital manages the SaaS layer of the same cloud
service. This represents that both A5: CSP and A2: Hospital share the re-
sponsibility of ensuring security needs are met and enforced at the SaaS
level, while only the A5: CSP is responsible for the IaaS and PaaS layers.
– Impacts: Threats or vulnerabilities which impact the security properties of
a cloud service. These may target a cloud service, or individual capabilities
within a cloud service. For example the threat Customer-data manipulation
and the vulnerability Insecure interface and APIs target the cloud services
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Patient Details Service and E-prescription Service, which indicates that any
entities encapsulated in the cloud services are indirectly impacted.
3.3 Cloud Environment Model
Reasoning about security in the cloud computing environment requires a more
detailed procedure due to the high complexity and its multi-parameter nature.
For assisting prospective users in modelling secure cloud services we have created
visual models of the system-under-design during our process based on the cloud
meta-model. The graphical notation of cloud security concepts and relationships
help facilitate understanding of complex cloud environments, where cloud secu-
rity engineers are able to holistically model and evaluate security properties of
cloud systems based on three conceptual layers at the organisational, application
and infrastructure level. Here we explain the cloud environment model through
the running example, instantiating concepts from our meta-model to create a
holistic cloud view as shown in Fig. 3. The novelty of the approach is based on
the three-layer view which assists designers in capturing the necessary concepts
for security reasoning holistically.
Organisation Concepts: We describe the stakeholders on the organisation
layer in the cloud environment model, identifying the direct and indirect stake-
holders as actors through their relationship with cloud services. In our running
example we have identified five actors; the A1: Patient is an end-user of the
cloud service 1: Patient Details Service and cloud service 2: E-prescription Ser-
vice, A2: Hospital manages cloud service 1 and they are a cloud service provider
to A1: Patient and a cloud user to A5: CSP, A3: Pharmacy manages the cloud
service 2 and is a cloud service provider to A1: Patient and a cloud user to A5:
CSP, A5: CSP is a cloud service provider that manages both clouds services at
all three service levels and A4: Malicious Actor is a malicious actor which poses
a security threat Customer-data manipulation.
Application Concepts: This layer represents the abstract concepts for
software and applications in the system-under-design, centring around cloud
services, components interacting with cloud services and the security impacts.
In our running example we model two cloud services, the security issues impact-
ing them, the virtual resources they require and partial solutions for mitigation.
The service and deployment models of each cloud service determines the actors
that owns the cloud service, actors responsible for managing the cloud service,
security issues and propagation of dependencies. For example the cloud service
Patient Details Service uses a SaaS model and is deployed publicly, determin-
ing that the CSP actor A5: CSP is responsible for managing components on
all three service model layers (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) while the actor A2: Hospital
manages the SaaS components. Customer-data manipulation is a cloud-specific
threat impacting all three service model layers [23], therefore the actors respon-
sible for the cloud services impacted by the threat will be held accountable for
deploying security mechanisms in order to mitigate identified threats. In this
case the Customer-data manipulation threat is realised through attacks Cross-
site scripting and SQL injection which exploit the Insecure interface and APIs
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Fig. 3. A holistic cloud view of the health-care running example.
vulnerability, where the cloud security engineer modelling the system has identi-
fied a security mechanism Web application scanners to protect the vulnerability
and thus mitigate the underlying threat.
Infrastructure Concepts: We define this layer to abstractly model phys-
ical components required to realise cloud computing services, which we capture
as infrastructure nodes belonging to one or more physical infrastructure contain-
ers representing IT infrastructure. In our running example, we model a single
physical infrastructure to represent one physical IT infrastructure owned and
managed by the CSP A5: CSP. The compute capabilities are enabled through
the abstract notions of a storage, compute and network entity, where they are
multi-tenant and geographically located in the USA. From these attributes we
can infer jurisdictional legislation such as the USA Patriot Act which applies
to all virtual resources residing on infrastructure physically located in the USA,
TrustBus2016 11
where multi-tenancy indicates that compute processes are physically shared with
one or more unknown cloud service users thus also violating HIPAA compliance.
In this scenario the cloud security engineer has a range of options for mitigating
these issues, one option is to change the service model of the cloud services to
IaaS and provision single-tenancy infrastructure nodes from a CSP geographi-
cally located outside the US, thus ensuring dedicated access to cloud computing
resources in order to comply with HIPAA regulations.
4 Related Work
Existing research in cloud security is primary focused on mitigating mecha-
nisms and software solutions at the implementation level, which targets software
systems that are already implemented and operational [20]. While most work
covers multiple security sub-areas, they only target these cloud computing is-
sues in isolation, for example considering security properties in software systems
or human factors on a social level but failing to provide direct correlations be-
tween the conceptual layers required to fully capture cloud computing issues
and indicate impact on security requirements [18, 9]. Li et al. provides a holis-
tic security requirements-eliciting approach towards socio-technical systems [16],
however this work lacks expressive power for capturing cloud computing-specific
properties which is essential for representing cloud security issues, impact and
mitigation. Beckers et al. provides a pattern-based approach for eliciting security
requirements and selecting security measures in a cloud computing context [17].
While they provide detailed descriptions of cloud components and properties
through their Cloud System Analysis Pattern (CSAP), they do not support
propagation of threats or directly model the correlation between security issues
and how they are addressed through the instantiation of solutions.
The proposed approach ensures that the system-under-design incorporates
security from the early requirements stage, thus addressing underlying vulner-
abilities and provides a foundation for implementing security mechanisms and
enforcing requirements. We achieve this by building upon existing work in se-
curity requirements engineering that lacks the capability to capture or reason
about cloud-specific security issues from a holistic point of view [15, 14]. This
is achieved through a systematic approach which describes and examines cloud
computing properties from three distinct but essential levels of abstraction, ag-
gregating layer-specific details to generate a holistic view of a cloud environ-
ment [19]. We identify cloud-specific threats and the impact of attacks within
the context of the cloud computing system to elicit security requirements, which
is realised through cloud service configurations.
5 Conclusion
Currently there is a lack of a methodology offering systematic support for the
process of realising organisational and business needs security through the cloud
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computing paradigm. Our work seeks to fill this gap by providing a methodolog-
ical approach for eliciting secure cloud environment needs from a requirements
engineering perspective, enabling developers to realise organisational needs on a
cloud computing context with security embedded in the process. We have defined
a language to capture cloud computing concepts that enables the modelling of
essential cloud properties required to describe cloud services, which we argue
represents both abstractly and through a fine-grained perspective, the organ-
isational needs and the relationships required for achieving them. We provide
a security-by-design approach using concepts from security requirements engi-
neering, allowing us to model and address cloud security threats and mitigation
mechanisms.
We are currently working on a framework to enable the automated transfor-
mation of cloud security controls into security patterns, thus providing a pat-
tern library for applying security policies and mechanisms from a security re-
quirements perspective. Initial efforts have been taken to identify patterns from
several domains in the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) provided by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA).
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